



VOX POPULI ON THE
**'GRAND
FINALE'**
BETWEEN
KOSOVO AND SERBIA
VOLUME II

June 2019

Supported by:



Norwegian Embassy



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***Vox Populi* on the ‘Grand Finale’ between Kosovo and Serbia**

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June 2019

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Executive Summary

The aim of this survey was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (*Vox Populi*) regarding the scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. This survey is the continuation of the first survey which was conducted between 17-26 December 2018. The fieldwork for this survey was completed between 21-28 May 2019. A total of 1107 respondents in our survey (87% Albanians, 9% Serbs and 4% from other ethnic groups) made our sample nationally representative of the Kosovo population. A preliminary questionnaire was first administered to a pilot group, in order to make final adjustments to the questionnaire.

In this survey, *simple proportional sampling* was used for each municipality, based on municipality population size. The questionnaire consisted of open and closed-ended questions. In order to check the work of interviewers during data collection, about 41% (a total of 450 respondents) were re-interviewed. This back-check was done through phone interviews and field visits. As a check, the respondents were asked about 5 questions based on the original interview. The checklist served as a tool of compliance review with the random principles of locality, starting point, house unit, and the principle of selection of the respondent. Responses from the first and the second interview were compared. In addition to the usual screening process, a logical check of the filled-in questionnaires was carried out. The 95% *error margin* of estimates based on the full sample is approximately +/-3 percentage points. However, confidence intervals for estimates based on subsets of the sample, such as the Serb sample of 94 respondents, will be considerably larger.

In terms of the results, in the subsequent paragraphs we present the findings on the following matters/issues:

- i)** halting or not halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia;
- ii)** in the event of a final deal between Kosovo and Serbia, should Kosovo seek to join Albania;

- iii) the perception of Kosovo's citizens related to **three scenarios** for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia;
- iv) the underlying reasons for support or lack of support related to the three scenarios for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia; and
- v) support for the US and EU policy towards reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

The first group of findings shows that the majority of the Kosovo population is *against halting the dialogue* between Kosovo and Serbia. Overall, **50%** of all the respondents do not agree with halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia should continue. There is less support among Albanians for continuing the dialogue, but a significant number of the Serb sample did not have a view on this question (13%). **49%** among Albanians and **61%** among Serbs either 'not at all' or 'somewhat' disagree with halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

The second group of the findings focused on the issue whether Kosovo should seek to join Albania if Kosovo is recognized by Serbia. In this context, the opinion is divided with, overall, **53%** supporting the idea that *Kosovo should seek unification with Albania* if Kosovo is recognized from Serbia and with **40%** rejecting the idea. However, **38%** among Albanians and **61%** among Serbs disagree with the option that Kosovo should seek unification with Albania if it is recognized from Serbia. The second group of findings also focused on potential reasons to join or not join Albania. These are the results about the reason that Kosovo **should seek** unification with Albania:

- To realize the dream of some Albanians to live within a single state (83% of Albanian versus 47% of the Serbian sample);
- Create a more prosperous state and environment for all Albanians (82% of Albanian versus 40% of the Serbian sample);
- Stabilize and bring peace to the Balkan region forever (76% of Albanian versus 33% of the Serbian sample).

Below are the results about the reason that Kosovo **should not seek** unification with Albania:

- It is rather better that Kosovo acts as a separate state in the international area (94% of Albanian versus 25% of the Serbian sample);
- Prosperity of Kosovo can be undermined by such a move (60% of Albanian versus 44% of the Serbian sample);
- It wouldn't be fair to other Albanians who live in other countries in the region (72% of Albanian versus 28% of the Serbian sample).

The third group of the findings is linked with the perception and preferences of Kosovo's citizens and potential reasons for supporting or lack of support for the **three alternative scenarios** for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia.

Thus, regarding **the first scenario- the status quo**-only a small number of participants (**7%**) responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. Separate analysis of the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat different pattern of responses. In this sense, **91%** among Albanians compared to **70%** among Serbs are either 'not at all satisfied' or 'very little satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. Below are results about the reason that respondents are **satisfied with the current status quo**:

- At least there is peace between Kosovo and Serbia (37% of Albanian versus 38% of the Serbian sample);
- At least prevents expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo (25% of Albanian versus 31% of the Serbian sample);
- It keeps the door open for maintaining strong Serbian influence in some parts of Kosovo (17% of Albanian versus 38% of the Serbian sample);
- At least we have economic prosperity (38% of Albanian versus 0% of the Serbian sample);
- There is good working relationships with the EU and UN (52% of Albanian versus 6% of the Serbian sample).

Below are results about the reason that respondents are **not satisfied with the current status quo**:

- Kosovo cannot have concrete moves to European integration (88% of Albanian versus 35% of the Serbian sample);
- We cannot achieve global recognition of Kosovo (83% of Albanian versus 18% of the Serbian sample);
- There cannot be economic prosperity (76% of Albanian versus 50% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo cannot have peaceful relations with Serbia (76% of Albanian versus 18% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo cannot solve internal problems between the Serb and Albanian communities (71% of Albanian versus 47% of the Serbian sample).

As to *the second scenario– granting executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community’ provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo* – there is even less support than for the first scenario. Only **9%** among respondents responded with either ‘*strongly agree*’ or ‘*somewhat agree*’ with the second scenario. There is weak support among Kosovo Albanians (**5%**), but significantly more support among Serbs (**48%**) to grant executive powers to the Kosovo Serb association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. Below are results about the reason that respondents **agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community**:

- It will improve the economic prosperity in Kosovo (61% of Albanian versus 40% of the Serbian sample);
- It will give Serbs who live in Kosovo more say in the decision making process (51% of Albanian versus 62% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve the integration of Serbian community in Kosovo (51% of Albanian versus 22% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve relationships with Serbia (43% of Albanian versus 22% of the Serbian sample).

Below are results about the reasons that respondents **do not agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community**:

- It will entrench divisions among communities in Kosovo (82% of Albanian versus 24% of the Serbian sample);
- It will increase the political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia (80% of Albanian versus 24% of the Serbian sample);
- It will open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska in Kosovo (89% of Albanian versus 6% of the Serbian sample);
- It will make it harder to achieve economic prosperity for Kosovo (73% of Albanian versus 12% of the Serbian sample);

Regarding *the third scenario- border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership*, the following findings were obtained: 32% of the total sample expressed support for this scenario. 32% among Albanian sample and 33% among Serbian sample reported that Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment option if it resulted in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership. Below are results about the reason that respondents **support border adjustment scenario** in return for global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership:

- Border adjustment is fair because both Serbia and Kosovo gain benefits for their people (66% of Albanian versus 0% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo is a winner party in this agreement because global recognition and UN membership provide major benefits for which border adjustment is a small price to pay (41% of Albanian versus 50% of the Serbian sample);
- Border adjustment like this would make Kosovo stronger and more united internally (57% of Albanian versus 0% of the Serbian sample).

Below are the reasons that respondents **do not support border adjustment scenario**:

- Border adjustment is not fair because Serbia is gaining more territory than Kosovo (85% of Albanian versus 1% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo is an independent country which should be given global recognition and UN membership without having to get involved in the border adjustment scenario with Serbia (93% of Albanian versus 3% of the Serbian sample);
- The benefits from global recognition and UN membership are not large enough to justify border adjustment (85% of Albanian versus 3% of the Serbian sample);
- Border adjustment like this would make Kosovo a weaker country (77% of Albanian versus 10% of the Serbian sample).

Regarding the *three scenarios*, a brief comparative analysis on the interpretation of the results generates the following picture: there is little support among respondents (7% responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied') for the continuation of the status quo (**scenario 1**) and slightly more (9% responded with either 'strongly agree' or 'somewhat agree') about granting executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo (**scenario 2**). However, there is more support (32% of respondents responded with either 'definitely should' or 'should') regarding the border adjustment which would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership (**scenario 3**).

A comparative evaluation between Albanians and Serbs related to the *three scenarios* engenders the subsequent findings: A small number of Albanian respondents (6%) and more Serbs (17%) expressed their satisfaction with the current status between Kosovo and Serbia(**scenario 1**). 5% among Albanians and 48% among Serbs expressed their agreement with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo(**scenario 2**). In contrast to the previous two scenarios, 32% among Albanians, and 33% among Serbs

supports border adjustment which would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and opened the path for UN membership (**scenario 3**).

The fourth and final group of the findings is linked with the support of Kosovo's citizens for the US and EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Overall, 63% responded with support for the US and 37% for the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 70% among Albanians compared to 5% among Serbs support the US policy towards reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. In contrast, 39% Albanians and 11% Serbs support the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

In brief, the perspectives of the two communities differ quite fundamentally in some respects: the Serb respondents showed particular concern about internal issues affecting the Serb community while the Albanian respondents, while undeniably worried about the risks of developing a mini Republika Srpska, were also concerned about external issues particularly integration with the EU. These differing perspectives are not, however, necessarily mutually contradictory – for example EU integration does not in itself entail any one specific solution for the internal problems between the two communities in Kosovo. The responses from our respondents suggest that, in these respects, dialogue does not need to be a 'zero-sum' game where any gains for one side have to be at the expense of losses for the other side.

1. Introduction

The first survey, *Vox Populi* on the 'Grand Finale' between Kosovo and Serbia, was conducted between 17-26 December 2018. Following the survey the first report was published and presented by the beginning of February 2019. At that time the aim of the survey was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of the citizens regarding the scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. Following the first survey, we conducted the second survey *Vox Populi* on the 'Grand Finale' between Kosovo and Serbia (Volume II) between 21-28 May 2019. Thus, another objective of the survey was to understand more in depth the motives and the attitudes of the citizens regarding the scenarios on the eventual Final Deal between Kosovo and Serbia. The aim of this survey was to understand the situational factors that impact on public support, or the lack of support, for different scenarios on the so called 'grand finale'.

For nearly a decade the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has been facilitated by the EU, and a number of agreements have been reached. While substantial progress has been achieved in terms of freedom of travel, border management, protection of the religious and cultural heritage, and the integration of police, many other agreements have not been implemented or only partially implemented by both countries.¹

Nonetheless, despite the progress and failures of the process of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the dialogue has been halted since November 2018. This was because the Kosovo government imposed a 10% tariff on all the imports of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the decision has been followed with 100% tariffs on all the Serbian and Bosnian goods.² This decision has been excused by the government of Kosovo as a response to the Serbian

¹ European Commission (2013) 'Serbia and Kosovo*: historic agreement paves the way for decisive progress in their EU perspectives', Press Release, 22 April. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-347_en.htm (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).

² Radio Free Europe (2018) 'Kosovo increases the customs tax for Serbia and Bosnia to 100 percent', 21 November. Available at: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/rritet-taksa-per-produktet-serbe-/29613129.html> (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).

government for its aggressive policy in the international arena against Kosovo's integration into international organizations, such as INTERPOL. The tariff has caused wide reaction by domestic and international actors, including the EU and the USA. The EU High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini has condemned the tariff stating that the CEFTA trade agreement has been violated. Moreover, the High Representative urged the Kosovo government to immediately revoke the decisions.³ These steps have put the dialogue in danger, with Serbia and Kosovo remaining in hostile positions. The United States embassy in Kosovo has urged for an immediate suspension of the tariff on imports from Serbia and Bosnia, considering it as a necessary measure to restore momentum to the dialogue process.⁴

Normalization of relations between two countries was reaffirmed once again in Berlin on April 29, 2019, in an event initiated by German chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emanuel Macron. Despite the fact that the event gathered all Western Balkans states, at the center of the discussions were Kosovo-Serbia relations.⁵ Although the meeting aimed to restore the dialogue, yet the tariff has not been revoked and dialogue remains blocked. The Berlin meeting has produced controversial positions on the manner of the continuation of the dialogue. Yet, the political debate on the imposed tariffs and on the possible scenarios for the eventual Final Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia continues. However, since March 2019, the role of international players had a minor change, with Germany and France trying to play a more active role and a temporary passive approach from the United States. However, President of

³ European Union External Service (2018) 'Statement by Federica Mogherini on the Kosovo Government decision on taxing goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina', Statement, 21 November. Available at: <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/54242/statement-federica-mogherini-kosovo-government-decision-taxing-goods-serbia-and-bosnia-and-en> (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).

⁴ U.S Embassy in Kosovo (2019) 'Statement from U.S Embassy Pristina', 22 January. Available at: <https://xk.usembassy.gov/statement-from-u-s-embassy-pristina-2/> (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).

⁵ European Western Balkans (2019) 'Germany to restart the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue with the Berlin meeting'

Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi has pointed out that no agreement could be reached without the crucial role of the United States in the process of the dialogue.⁶

Notwithstanding all the facts and the complex context of the dialogue at times, based on discussions and analysis of different policymakers and relevant stakeholders both in Kosovo and Serbia and at the international level, different potential scenarios for an eventual Final Agreement might be outlined. Those scenarios to name a few entail, executive powers for Serb Association/community, border adjustments between Kosovo and Serbia, 'two Germanys model' and so forth. In this context, the present research report aims to outline and deconstruct the extent of public support among Kosovo citizens for possible scenarios on the comprehensive Final Agreement that would be legally binding between Kosovo and Serbia.

This research report besides other issues provides a detailed analysis of the findings on the main potential scenarios for a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, and the motives that drive the citizens towards, or away from, any particular scenario. It focuses on three main potential scenarios: a) continuation of the status-quo; b) de facto recognition from Serbia, in exchange for extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community; and c) border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition for Kosovo, and a concrete pathway for UN membership.

In addition to that, the research report outlines and analyzes the citizen's support of the US policy and EU policy towards the process of the dialogue, and the possible comprehensive Final Deal that would be legally binding between Kosovo and Serbia. While these are some of the key issues and scenarios examined in this research report, a significant number of potential variants and options will also be discussed.

⁶ Radio Free Europe (2019) 'Summit of expectations, but also major disagreements' 21 April. Available at: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/samiti-i-berlinit-/29912751.html> (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).

2. Methodology

2.1. Survey Design

The questionnaire consisted of closed-ended questions with the following structure: demographic data about the participants, their understanding, attitudes and support, or lack of support, for the potential Scenarios/Options for the Final Agreement/Deal between Kosovo and Serbia. The questionnaire was first administered to a pilot group of 30 respondents in order to test its comprehensibility for respondents and in order to make final adjustments to the questionnaire.


2.2. Survey Procedure

The research team consisted of 15 field interviewers (2 per each of the 7 regions of Kosovo, plus two special interviewers for Serb respondents in Kosovo) and 4 researchers, Key Expert and 2 Senior Experts, and a junior researcher. Their work resulted in the current research report. Field interviewers administered the questionnaires with tablets using specially-designed software for this survey. The questionnaire was filled by field interviewers to ensure that there were no missing data. However, the respondents were free not to respond to the questions. In order to avoid interviewing bias, the research team trained all field interviewers in conducting the survey.

In order to check the work of interviewers during data collection, about 41% (a total of 450 respondents) were re-interviewed. This back-check was done chiefly through phone interviews and some field visits. As a check, the respondents were asked about 5 questions based on the original interview. The checklist served as a tool for compliance review with the principle of randomized selection of respondents (covering selection of locality, starting point, house unit, and selection of the respondent). Responses from the first and the second interview were compared. In addition to the usual screening process, a logical control of the filled-in questionnaires was carried out.

2.3. Sampling

The survey was carried out in 38 Kosovo municipalities of the 7 main regions in Kosovo: Prishtina, Ferizaj, Gjilan, Prizren, Peja, Gjakova and Mitrovica (North and South, see the map below). Kosovo has a population of 1,798,506 inhabitants.⁷ In this survey, simple proportional sampling was used for each municipality, based on municipality population size, that is on the ratio of the number of registered population in a specific municipality to the total number of registered inhabitants in Kosovo. The resulting ratio determines the weight of each municipality in the sample. The baseline of the registered population was derived from the Kosovo Statistical Agency.



⁷ Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2018) "Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2018". Available at: <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/4369/statistical-yearbook-2018.pdf> (Accessed on: 11/06/2019).


The questionnaires were administered in respondents' houses and apartments. A random route sampling procedure was used to determine the study sample, with prescribed rules for the choice of starting point, and the subsequent selection of street, building, apartment and respondent. The questionnaire was administered to only 1 family member. This was done as such in order to avoid bias in the sample.

In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample of Serbs for useful analysis, the two major predominantly Serbian municipalities Mitrovica North (in the north of Kosovo) and Graçanica (in the South of Kosovo) were oversampled. This yielded a sample of 94 Serbian respondents instead of the 50 respondents that would have been obtained without oversampling.

2.4. Sample Characteristics

The total number of respondents is 1107. With a sample of this size, estimates will have a sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points (at the five percent level of significance). Note however that the sampling error will be considerably larger when estimates are just for the Serb sample of 94 respondents: with a sample of 94, the 95% confidence interval will be approximately plus or minus 1 percentage points. All differences between the Serb and Albanian samples have therefore been checked for statistical significance.

As noted above, the study has been conducted across all (seven) Kosovo regions and (thirty-eight) municipalities. See below the sample distribution in the seven regions.



Since the number of interviews for each municipality was based on the proportion of the population in each municipality the distribution of the achieved sample thus corresponds closely to the distribution of the population. See below the table depicting the size of the population based on Kosovo Agency of Statistics⁸ and number of interviews per municipality.


No	Municipality	Population	No. of Interviews
1	<i>Ferizaj</i>	<i>103,003</i>	<i>63</i>
2	<i>Shtime</i>	<i>27,654</i>	<i>35</i>
3	<i>Kaçanik</i>	<i>33,409</i>	<i>20</i>
4	<i>Shtërpcë</i>	<i>6,773</i>	<i>8</i>
5	<i>Hani i Elezit</i>	<i>9,998</i>	<i>6</i>
6	<i>Gjakovë</i>	<i>95,340</i>	<i>58</i>
7	<i>Rahovec</i>	<i>59,102</i>	<i>36</i>
8	<i>Deçan</i>	<i>41,808</i>	<i>26</i>
9	<i>Junik</i>	<i>6,370</i>	<i>4</i>
10	<i>Gjilan</i>	<i>80,162</i>	<i>48</i>
11	<i>Kamenica</i>	<i>30,750</i>	<i>19</i>
12	<i>Viti</i>	<i>47,615</i>	<i>29</i>
13	<i>Ranillug</i>	<i>3,810</i>	<i>3</i>
14	<i>Novobërdë</i>	<i>7,160</i>	<i>5</i>
15	<i>Partesh</i>	<i>1730</i>	<i>2</i>

⁸Ibid.

16	<i>Kllokot</i>	2,753	2
17	<i>Mitrovicë</i>	69,346	44
18	<i>Vushtrri</i>	64,468	39
19	<i>Mitrovica Veriore</i>	12,211	40
20	<i>Zveçan</i>	7,376	5
21	<i>Zubin Potok</i>	6,616	5
22	<i>Leposaviq</i>	13,587	8
23	<i>Skenderaj</i>	52,343	32
24	<i>Pejë</i>	99,568	61
25	<i>Istog</i>	40,380	11
26	<i>Klin</i>	40,122	12
27	<i>Prishtinë</i>	211,755	131
28	<i>Obiliq</i>	19,144	12
29	<i>Fushë Kosovë</i>	38,607	24
30	<i>Lipjan</i>	57,733	35
31	<i>Podujevë</i>	83,445	51
32	<i>Glllogoc</i>	61,133	19
33	<i>Graçanicë</i>	12,091	20
34	<i>Prizren</i>	191,565	112
35	<i>Suharekë</i>	60,247	21
36	<i>Malishevë</i>	58,269	36
37	<i>Mamushë</i>	5,950	4
38	<i>Dragash</i>	34,316	21
Total		1,798,506	1107

87% of the study sample were Albanians, 9% Serbs and 4% were from other ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Albanian percentage of the sample closely corresponds to that recorded in the 2011 census, which shows that 91% were Albanian, 3.4% Serb and 5.6% 'Other'. The relatively large Serb proportion in the sample reflects the oversampling of the Serb population. (The small number of 'other' ethnic groups is too small for useful analysis and does not provide a reliable basis for weighting.)

55.5% of the sample is male and 44.5% is female. The mean age of the sample is 41 years old and the age range is 18-91 years old. Below is the distribution of the sample by age group.



Compared with census figures for 2011, men and younger people are somewhat over-represented in the achieved sample (although less so than in the first survey). Moreover, neither age nor gender are strongly related to the distribution of the variables on which this report focuses. We have therefore simply reported the unweighted percentages.

Regarding education level, 1% of the sample reported having no school degree, 3% reported elementary education only (1-5 classes), 15% reported lower secondary education (6-9 classes), 44% upper secondary school (gymnasium or vocational), 2% the post-secondary vocational education, 29% reported university (Bachelor) degree, 5% mostly with Master, and few with PhDs. As is usual with surveys, there is some over-representation of those with higher education.

Regarding the employment level of our sample, 44% reported to have been employed at the time of interview, 25% unemployed, 9% students, 10% retired, 12% fulfilling domestic tasks, and few unspecified. Concerning employment categories, 18% reported to have been professional or in technical occupations (e.g., doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, etc.), 4% higher administrator occupations (e.g., banker, executive in big business, government official, etc.), 4% clerical occupations (e.g., secretary, office manager, book keeper, etc.), 12% sales

occupations (e.g., sales manager, shop owner, etc.), 5% service occupations (e.g., restaurant owner, police officer, caretaker, etc.), 7% skilled worker (e.g., motor mechanic, electrician, etc.), 3% semi-skilled worker (e.g., bus driver, carpenter, etc.), 2% unskilled worker (e.g., labourer, porter, etc.), 2% farm worker (e.g., farmer, farm labourer, etc.), 13% students, 21% housewives.

2.5. Data analysis

Participants' responses were entered in SPSS. Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and cross-tabulations by ethnic groups were used to analyze the data. We have also checked whether results varied by age, gender, educational level and employment situation.

3. Findings: The way forward or backward


This section outlines the findings of this survey under four sub-sections: **(i)** halting or not halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia; **(ii)** in the event of a final deal between Kosovo and Serbia, should Kosovo remain independent or join Albania; **(iii)** the perception of Kosovo's citizens related to the *three scenarios* for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia (including the underlying reasons for support or lack of support related to the three scenarios); and **(iv)** perception of Kosovo's citizens regarding the support of US and EU's policy towards reaching an comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

3.1. Halting or not halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia


In relation to this issue, the following question was asked: **Do you agree with the halting of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?**

The findings concerning this issue produced the following landscape: Half of the sample, 50% of the total, disagreed with halting the dialogue (42% saying that they agree 'not at all' and a further 8% saying 'very little'). Approximately, 42% responded that they (12% saying either 'somewhat' and 30% 'very much')

agreed with halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 9% among participants 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue. There is therefore a clear balance in favour of continuing the dialogue.



Assessment of responses for the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat similar pattern of responses (although differences between the two groups are statistically significant): 49% among Albanians and about 61% among Serbs either 'very little' or 'not at all' agree with halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 43% among Albanians and 27% among Serbs either 'somewhat' or 'very much' agree with halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 8% among Albanians and 13% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue.




3.2. Should Kosovo seek unification with Albania?


Turning next to the question whether Kosovo should join Albania, the survey posed the following question:

If Kosovo is recognized by Serbia, should Kosovo seek unification with Albania?


53% of the total sample responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 40% responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 7% among participants 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.



Evaluation of responses of the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a contrasting (and very significantly different) pattern of responses, however: 57% among Albanians and only 15% among Serbs responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 38% among Albanians and 61% among Serbs responded with Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized from Serbia (see the graph below). 5% among Albanians and 25% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue.




In a series of follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the respondents' underlying reasons for why Kosovo should or should not seek unification with Albania. We show below the differences between Albanians and Serbs regarding the underlying reasons that Kosovo should seek unification with Albania. These questions were asked only to respondents who responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia (57% Albanian and 15% Serbs having responded affirmatively about unification):



As can be seen, of respondents who were in favour of unification, the Albanians held generally positive views of the economic, political and aspirational benefits of unification, whereas the Serbian respondents were markedly less positive about these three reasons.

Turning next to the reasons for not seeking unification, the respondents who had responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' seek unification with Albania were asked a parallel but somewhat different series of follow-up questions (remember 38% of Albanian and 61% of Serbs did not want to seek unification and hence were asked these particular follow-up questions):



Here we can see that the Albanian respondents who were opposed to unification were particularly likely to see international advantages to having two states, and were considerably less mindful of economic benefits.

3.3. The *three scenarios* for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia


Participants were exposed to the following options/alternatives for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia: a) continuation of the status quo; b) de facto recognition from Serbia, and with extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community; and c) border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo, and opening the path for UN membership. To clarify, interviewers explained to respondents, and it was also written down in the survey, what was meant with the status quo⁹, and de-facto and extended executive powers.¹⁰

⁹By status quo, I mean lack of mutual recognition and pending political and diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Serbia.


¹⁰By de facto recognition, I mean that Serbia recognizes Kosovo's institutions but it will not recognize Kosovo's statehood; by extended executive powers, I mean powers that would include constitutional change in Kosovo and would create new political entity in Kosovo, that would be a semi-autonomous entity.

3.3.1. First scenario: Continuation of the status quo


Regarding the first scenario, respondents were asked the following question: How satisfied are you with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia? 7% of the total sample responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia (see the chart below). The majority of participants (89%) responded with either 'very little' or 'not at all satisfied' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. 4% responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.



Separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a somewhat different pattern of responses. 6% among the Albanian sample and 17% among Serbs are either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. 91% among Albanians compared with 70% among Serbs are either 'very little satisfied' or 'not at all satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia (see the graph below). 3% among Albanians and 13% among Serbs responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. These differences are statistically significant (at the 0.01 level), but the results are in line with the idea that there is, in both communities, a mood for change.




Then, we proceeded with a number of follow-up questions about the underlying reasons why respondents were or were not satisfied with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. Respondents who responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia, responded in the following way (see the graph below) regarding the underlying reasons why they were satisfied with the current status quo (remember that only 6% of the Albanian and 17% of the Serb samples were satisfied and hence were exposed to these particular follow-up questions, so the responses are based on very small numbers):



As can be seen, neither Albanian nor Serbian respondents were especially enthusiastic about any of these reasons for maintaining the status quo only the final one – good current working relationships with the EU and UN – getting majority support from the Albanian sample.

We turn next to the respondents who were either 'not at all satisfied' or 'very little satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. These respondents were asked a parallel by differently-worded set of follow-up questions were posed. Remember that the great majority of both Albanian (91%) and Serb (70%) samples were dissatisfied with the status quo and hence were asked this series of questions:




As can be seen, the Albanian respondents were most likely to cite absence of concrete moves towards European integration as their reason for dissatisfaction, followed closely by lack of global recognition, lack of recognition by Serbia, lack of economic prosperity, and lack of solution to internal problems between the two communities. Serbian respondents had very different priorities however, particularly focusing on economic prosperity and on the unresolved internal problems.


3.3.2. Second scenario: De facto recognition from Serbia, and with extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/Community

Concerning this scenario, participants were asked the following question: Do you agree with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo? A small number of participants (9%) either 'strongly agree' or 'somehow agree' about granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. The majority of participants (86%) however either 'somehow disagree' or 'strongly disagree' about granting extended executive


powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo.



Analysis of responses among Albanian and Serbian sample reveals highly contrasting patterns of responses. Only 5% among Albanians compared to 48% among Serbs either 'strongly agree' or 'somehow agree' about granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. 93% among Albanians compared to 35% among Serbs either 'somehow disagree' or 'strongly disagree' about granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. 2.5% among Albanians and 17% among Serbs 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue.




With a number of follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the underlying reasons why respondents did or did not agree with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. Respondents who responded with either 'strongly agree' or 'somewhat agree' with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community, were asked the following questions (remember, only 5% of the Albanian but 48% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



Among the Serbian respondents who were asked these particular follow-up questions, the reason most often given was to give Serbs more say in the decision making process. This reason outscored by a considerable margin among Serbs alternative reasons to do with integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo and improving relationships with Serbia.


Turning next to those respondents who responded with 'strongly disagree' or 'somehow disagree' with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community, a different series of follow-up questions were posed (remember, 93% Albanian and 35% Serbian sample were exposed to these questions):



As can be seen, the Albanian respondents who were opposed to granting executive powers to the KSA strongly agreed that such powers might open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska, followed closely by concerns over entrenching divisions among communities in Kosovo and increased political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia.


3.3.3. Third scenario: Border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo, and open the path for UN membership

As far as this scenario is concerned, respondents were asked the following question: If border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership, should Kosovo support such an agreement to adjust borders? 32% of the sample responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment option which would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership (see the chart below). Conversely, 61% responded with Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' support the border adjustment option which would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership. 7% 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.




Separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a very similar pattern of responses. 32% among Albanians and 33% among Serbs responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment scenario if it resulted in the global recognition of Kosovo and opening the path for UN membership. 62% among Albanians and 55% among Serbs responded that Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' support the border adjustment scenario even if it would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and opening the path for UN membership. 6% among

Albanians and 12% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue. (None of these differences apart from the 'don't know' responses were statistically significant between the two communities.)




With a number of follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the underlying reasons why respondents would or would not support border adjustment scenario. Respondents who responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment scenario if it resulted in the global recognition of Kosovo and opening the path for UN membership, were asked the following questions (remember, 32% of the Albanian and 33% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



Among the Albanian respondents who were asked these particular follow-up questions, the reason most often given for the support was that this agreement would be fair and slightly less also thought that border adjustment would make Kosovo stronger and more united internally. Serbian respondents thought that with border adjustment agreement Kosovo would be a winner party due to global recognition and UN membership.

Turning next to those respondents who responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' support the border adjustment scenario if it resulted in the global recognition of Kosovo and opening the path for UN membership, were asked the following questions (remember, 62% of the Albanian and 55% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



As can be seen, the Albanian respondents who were against the border adjustment scenario most often agreed that Kosovo is an independent country which should be given global recognition and UN membership with no need to make border adjustment agreement.


4. Do you support the current US and EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia?

Concerning the international support for the legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, respondents were asked the following questions:


(a) Do you support the US policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia?

63% responded with 'yes' for the support of the US policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 21% with 'no', indicating against the support of the US policy toward reaching a

comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. And, 16% responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' on this issue.




Analysis of responses among Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a different pattern of responses. 70% among Albanians and 5% among Serbs responded with 'yes' indicating the support for the US policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 16% among Albanians and 75% responded with 'no', indicating against the support of the US policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 14% among Albanian and 20% Serbian respondents responded with 'do not know/do not have a view on this' issue.




(b) Do you support the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia?

37% responded with 'yes' indicating the support for the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 45% with 'no', indicating against the support of the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. And, 18% responded with 'don't know/don't have a view' on this issue.



Analysis of responses among Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a different pattern of responses. 39% among Albanians and 11% among Serbs responded with 'yes' for the support of the EU policy toward reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 44% among Albanians and 67% responded with 'no', indicating against the support of the EU policy towards reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. 17% among Albanian and 22% Serbian respondents responded with 'do not know/do not have a view on this' issue.



5. Comparative analysis

In this section, we analyze and compare some of the main questions from the second and first survey. The first survey was conducted in December 2018 and the second in May 2019. The aim of the second survey was to explore more in depth the scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. Consequently, the second survey in many respects resembles the first survey, which has similar methodology, method for selection of municipalities and selection of sample. See below some of the main questions and comparative analysis:

a) Halting or not halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?

It seems that there is an increased tendency towards halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia among Kosovar public opinion (29% Survey 1 – 42% Survey 2). Nevertheless, it remains that the majority of the population is against halting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (62% Survey 1 – 50% Survey 2). Further analysis reveals that the increased tendency toward halting the dialogue is present among both Albanian sample (30% Survey 1 – 43% in Survey 2) and Serbian sample (19% Survey 1 – 27%).

The change over time is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). However, there were some relevant methodological changes between the two surveys (with the response codes provided in a different order in the two surveys). We cannot therefore rule out the possibility that the change is a methodological artefact. Before drawing any firm conclusions, we need to check the pattern of change over time for the other key measures.

b) *Should Kosovo seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia?*

While there is a decreased support for the continuation of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, there is an increased support for unification with Albania. 43% in Survey 1 compared to 53% in Survey 2 of the total sample support the unification of Kosovo with Albania. Comparably, 50% in Survey 1 compared to 40% in Survey 2 rejected the idea of unification. Further analysis reveals that the support for unification for Albania has been increased among both the Albanian sample (44% Survey 1 – 57% in Survey 2) and the Serbian sample (6% Survey 1 – 15% Survey 2). It should be noted that there has been a high number of responses among Serbian respondents with 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue (27% Survey 1 – 25% Survey 2).

This change is again statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Since the question is asked in an identical way in the two surveys, we can have more confidence in the result. It remains true however that opinion remains rather evenly divided between unification with Albania and maintaining the two-state status quo. The balance of opinion has shifted, but not decisively so. It may well be that opinion will remain rather volatile on this issue, which remains at present a hypothetical issue.

c) *Three alternative scenarios for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia*

Regarding the scenario – **status quo** – comparison of results shows that there is an increased dissatisfaction with the current status quo between Kosovo and

Serbia (79% Survey 1 – 89% in Survey 2). This increase has been noted among both the Albanian sample (82% Survey 1 – 91% in Survey 2) and the Serbian sample (50% Survey 1 – 70% in Survey 2). Once again the change is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). One possible interpretation of this finding is that, the longer the stalemate continues with several unresolved issues remaining, the greater is the population's frustration at the lack of progress.

Scenario – **granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo** – overall results, that is being against this scenario, remain relatively stable (84% Survey 1 – 86% Survey 2). However, further analysis shows a reversed pattern of results among Albanian and Serbian sample. Among Albanians there is a decreased support for this scenario (9% Survey 1 – 5% Survey 2) and among Serbs there is a great increase in support for this scenario (16% Survey 1 – 48% Survey 2). It should be noted that among Serbian respondents, response with 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue remains high (25% Survey 1 – 17% Survey 2).

We must remember that the samples of Serb respondents are quite small (around 100 respondents in each of the two surveys). However, the increased proportion of the Serb samples who support extended executive powers for the KSA is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). There does therefore appear to be some increase in the extent of polarization between the two communities on this issue. This may once again reflect frustration at the unresolved issues between Serbia and Kosovo.

Scenario – **border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership** – overall results, that is supporting this scenario remain relatively stable (30% Survey 1 – 32% Survey 2). The support among Albanian sample is slightly increased (30% Survey 1 – 32% Survey 2) and slightly more among Serbs (27% Survey 1 – 33% Survey 2). It should be noted that there has been a significant decrease in 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue among Serbs

(26% Survey 1 – 12% Survey 2). However, none of these changes is statistically significant.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this survey was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (*Vox Populi*) regarding the scenarios for the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. A total of 1107 respondents in our survey (87% Albanians, 9% Serbs and 4% from other ethnic groups) make our sample nationally representative of the Kosovo population. This survey, conducted in May 2019, repeats many questions from our first survey which was conducted in December 2018. It thus enables us to examine changes over the last five-six months. The survey also added some new questions exploring in more depth people's reasons for their preferences about the various scenarios.

In most respects, the present survey reiterates and reinforces the findings from the first survey. In particular we find, as in the first survey, that:

- There is in both the Albanian and Serbian communities support for continuing the dialogue with Serbia;
- There is in both communities considerable dissatisfaction with the status quo;
- There is very little support in the Albanian community for granting extended executive powers to the KSA but somewhat more in the Serb community;
- There is a fair amount of support in both communities for border adjustments with Serbia, providing that this brings global recognition, although supporters for this scenario are outnumbered by opponents.

However, while the overall outlines have changed little, there are a number of indications of what might be interpreted as increasing frustration with the lack of progress in resolving the outstanding issues between Serbia and Kosovo. Thus, there is increased dissatisfaction with the status quo and declining support

for the continuation of the dialogue. There is also worrying evidence of increased polarization between the two communities over executive powers for the KSA.

Turning to the follow-up questions which asked respondents about their reasons, we found substantial differences in the reasoning of the two communities. In the case of the *first scenario*, dissatisfaction with the status quo, Albanian respondents were most likely to cite absence of concrete moves towards European integration as their reason for dissatisfaction (88%), followed closely by lack of global recognition (83%), lack of peaceful relations with Serbia (76%), lack of economic prosperity (76%), and lack of solution to internal problems between the two communities (71%). Serbian respondents had very different priorities however, particularly focusing on lack of economic prosperity (50%) and on the unresolved internal problems (47%).

In the case of the *second scenario*, giving executive powers to the KSA, the Serbian respondents who were in favor for the scenario were particularly like to give as their reason more say in the decision making process (62%). This reason outscored by a considerable margin among Serbs alternative reasons to do with integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo (22%) and improving relationships with Serbia (22%).

In contrast the Albanian respondents who were opposed to granting executive powers to the KSA strongly agreed that such powers might open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska (89%), followed closely by concerns over entrenching divisions among communities in Kosovo (82%) and increased political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia (80%).

In the case of the *third scenario*, border adjustment in return for global recognition, the predominant reason for opposition from the Albanian community was that Kosovo, as an independent country, should not have to give up territory in order to gain recognition (93%). They also agreed that Serbia would gain more territory than Kosovo (85%), and that the benefits were not all

that large (85%), and that the border adjustments might weaken the country (77%).

Among the Albanians who supported the third scenario, there was loss whole hearted support for any of the proposed reasons, though a majority thought it would be fair (66%) and would strengthen the country (57%), whereas only (41%) thought that there would be major benefits.

More generally, the perspectives of the two communities differ quite fundamentally in some respects: the Serb respondents showed particular concern about internal issues affecting the Serb community while the Albanian respondents, while undeniably worried about the risks of developing a mini Republika Srpska, were also concerned about external issues particularly integration with the EU and global recognition. These differing perspectives are not, however, necessarily mutually contradictory – for example EU integration does not in itself entail any one specific solution for the internal problems between the two communities in Kosovo. The responses from our respondents suggest that, in these respects, dialogue does not need to be a 'zero-sum' game where any gains for one side have to be at the expense of losses for the other side.

